

RAN A4G Night ramp strike story — a series of notes and images, added over a year or so — explains various points about this event — 01 September 1971



For information on former Australian Military (incl. RAN) aircraft visit www.adf-serials.com.au

Go to: <http://www.youtube.com/user/bengello/videos> for more video clips of RAN A4G Skyhawks & other RAN FAA Aircraft from the HMAS Melbourne era



Click image to start the movie. Clip from <http://www.adf-serials.com> An A4G RAN FAA Skyhawk 876 landing on HMAS Melbourne in the late 1970's.

Ramp Strike aboard HMAS Melbourne 01 Sept 1971 – Phil Thompson

(This text is an e-mail written in response to a question about which pilot was involved in this incident and the questioner's comment: '...it must have frightened the daylight out of you!') [Written for non-pilot readers.]

It was night time already — the 'daylights were already out of me' after the first night Deck Landing (DL). :-) While this first one — as I found out later was not perfect, it didn't look so bad after my second NON night DL — the ramp strike. I was thereafter the pilot the sailors could approach to say "Geesus, Sir you scared the bejeezus out of me" and these guys were in the front (as the 'birdies' [FAA] liked to call the bow) or where ever. The admiral (not the captain) was in his cabin directly under the ramp. It had just been refurbished. He invited me up there to congratulate me on surviving and to show me (with good humour) the absolute chaos it had caused in his cabin, as the ceiling (made of painted cork) had fallen in on him. Above the cork ceiling (for soundproofing) were many inches of specially strengthened steel by the way. HMAS Melbourne's deck (generally) was remade (before this to be able to operate A4s) and in this area was supported by extra footings to enable it to take the A4 bumps in the landing zone.

I guess I had better days and nights but it was scary just to go out there for the first time. Not really knowing the drill, having a GCA (ground controlled approach) at low level to the 'slot' or 'groove' where we would start to look ahead see the ball and start the approach, monitored then by the LSO (Landing Signal Officer). So I guess the unknown is worse if it is poorly anticipated. However I knew that to be the reverse — complacent — was not an option. Jet pilots probably get addicted to the adrenaline rush. I'm sure most of the young pilots were just "powered by adrenaline" most of the time.

At this point the aim was to have about 20 day catapults (and about 2 times as many Deck Landings — touch and go and arrests) and depending, to then move on to Night DLs, as getting the ship time was not always easy. An RAN pilot does not have his wings confirmed officially until his first Day DL; so it is a big deal, for lots of reasons. My first DLs were onboard HMS Eagle on its farewell tour before being scrapped. But being a 'sprog newbie' I was only allowed to do 4 (hook up) Touch and Gos; but they still counted as day DLs. That was in 02 Aug 71. At that point I had done the required 100 day/night DDLs (Dummy Deck Landings) or the old term for these was MADDLS (Mirror Assisted Dummy Deck Landings).

Just before my first DLs on HMAS Melbourne I did a further 9 night DDLs on the 12th Aug & on 20th Aug 8 more by day, before doing 2 'hook up' (touch and go's) DLs on Melb for the first time on the 23rd, then I trapped for the first time on the 24th Aug with 6 DLs and 2 catapults (so 2 out of the six were traps, just wanted to make the point that there is no distinction between a hook up or hook down DL — if it is a good one). My ramp strike did not count as a DL. :-)

At this time of the year the westerlies (winds) are howling and it is freezing at Nowra. Not a good time for a swim. By 01 Sep I had 38 day DLs and 22 cats by day — the minimum experience (later changed to a larger requirement) to go out by night. As I say the first hook up Touch & Go was good enough; so I guess the second (also hook up) was fortunate in that had the hook been down — I may not have been here to tell you all this. The hook would have tried to rip off some deck plates and then it would have been goodnight.

It is probably obvious that lots of good things occurred to help me survive that night — apart from being silly enough to hit the ramp in the first place. Believe me it was not my intention to do so. Rather than go into details which require lots of explanation I'll just tell the story as it comes.

My memory of this approach as it started to go bad is pretty much burnt into my brain. So if this is describing "having the daylight out of me" then you are correct. :-)

As the ball (orange ball between line of green datum lights) started to drop rapidly as I was very close to Touch Down, I could see with my mind's eye that a series of bad events were unfolding. I had started high so had reduced power to get back to the glideslope. This is a pretty average start for a night DL from a Carrier Controlled Approach (GCA from the ship). But being inexperienced the juggling then required to get back to the glideslope etc. is the key.

Meanwhile the deck is moving — which is not always dampened at every point by the gyro mirror. The LSO (a fellow A4 pilot especially trained and experienced) watches the movement of the deck and how it is synchronising with the aircraft approach. The LSO's judgement overrides all others when the aircraft is in the groove. He grades and debriefs us after our DLs.

On this night another LSO from the S2 Tracker squadron was being trained on the A4 approach. He was very experienced on S2s and A4s in the States but had little night experience (with A4s) here. Not that this is an issue; but I make the point that any one accident is a combination of factors. In this case I can only take full responsibility 'fully' for not making a better approach; or whatever it would take to keep me away from the ramp. So please don't misconstrue this remark. I also make the point that most likely the weather/sea state was marginal for my experience (as a subsequent report stated); but one has to fly to the conditions and make one's own judgements, this is the nature of military flying.

As the ball started to really accelerate down, I was already powering up to a lot of RPM, as I had decided that it was "a ball of wax" and I was 'out-of-here'. Usually on a reasonable approach that, requires a bit of power, the LSO will smoothly say "Power". Sometimes when it is urgent he will start shouting rapidly "Power, Power, POWER" followed rapidly by "Wave Off, Wave Off, WAVE OFF" (if necessary) which we have to obey — even if it just a drill (practice Wave off) on an otherwise good approach.

I didn't get the "Power" but I got the "Wave Off" — this was how desperate my situation had become. Meanwhile I'm advancing the throttle to full power a microsecond earlier as I have decided for myself that the crap is in the fan. It takes an eternity for the A4 engine to develop full power (I'm joking) but it depends on the circumstances. Luckily the engine was accelerating already. Literally as the ball started to drop (from the deck moon lighting) I could see that I was going to go below the level of the deck (this surprised me tremendously). I was determined to make the best wave off I could, to get the maximum out of the Optimum Angle of Attack (this is how we land, at the OAOA) to maximise my survival. This is SOP anyway. [I was not "spotting the deck" and I was not seeing the deck or the mirror at this stage - after nose rotates up.]

The A4 had gone slightly below the deck [just my impression] (mostly because the deck gave an out of synch pitch up — this happens) but it compounded my problem. If you ever saw or imagine the round down then it is possible to be climbing out of the hole — so to speak — and be going UP before striking the ramp. This is more or less what happened but the only real witnesses — the LSOs — were not enjoying the show. Quite rightly they had both hit the safety net off the LSO's station. This is a big loss of face for them and they never let me forget it. Can you imagine jumping off the deck into the black void hoping there was a net below? [They did know that their safety net was there but they cannot see it or the water at night.] I was safe and warm in my A4. :-) [Subsequently the ship's SE on deck that night has confirmed the 'out of synch' pitchup.]


Of course there was an almighty bump as the wheels hit the deck and the U/C flexed so much that the inner brakes gouged the steel deck before the U/C broke — but I was going UP at the time — if I had still be going down it would have been all over. Thank goodness for relative motion etc. [Photo of ramp damage + diagram](#)

The cockpit lit up with just about every warning light except the fire warning light, otherwise I would have ejected. Anyway I was concentrating on doing my best OAO climbout and checking things out. The ship was frazzled enough to direct me "east" to NAS Nowra from "mother", but I was heading west no matter what anyone said. The air controller had just been in the west off Perth so it was their habit to go east to land there.

I had minimum fuel but there was enough to fly at slow speed to NAS Nowra. Another A4 was airborne to take my slot for his own DLs. It was our senior pilot Leut Barrie Daly, who had a look at the dangling U/C & suggested I keep it down. This is SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) along with carrying the empty drop tanks to use as emergency U/C in such damaged landings. I had thought about this, and read about similar landings in our flight safety literature, so catching the wire just past the threshold on Runway 26 back at NAS Nowra, was not a problem. There was no time for foaming the R/W, and as I arrested (with a much longer pullout of the wire, as that is the nature of the wire at NAS), the scariest moment for me occurred. The drop tanks still had fuel vapour in them, which from the outside caused a spectacular WHOOSH of ignition & a brief tail of flames (remember this is night fireworks time) which I saw as a bloody catastrophe in the mirrors and the bright reflections around me.

The throttle was put to OFF and I was out of that cockpit (without needing the customary A4 ladder, because I was on the ground already) running to the edge of the R/W. —Phew— Spectators said they had never seen anyone run so fast. I agree.


Later I heard about what this event looked like from those on the ship. They said the shower of sparks was amazing, as the steel met steel. I was lucky also that the undercarriage leg stubs did not catch a wire, that would have been catastrophic. So I was airborne again before reaching the No. 1 wire. You can see on the photo how the black tyre marks start/stop and the gouges of the brake mechanism (inside the wheel) on the steel deck (before it broke, along with everything else related to the U/C). [Later I was told that paint marks from the drop tank fins were on the deck but painted over quickly - so I never saw them myself.]




As mentioned on the ADF site, it was a year before the A4 could be mended with a permanent (acceptable) bend in the airframe. I recall I was supposed to take it on the first (squadron) test flight, but this flight was cancelled due to bad weather and subsequently someone else took it up.

The aftermath:





HMAS Melbourne Round Down
Tyre marks



Wheel Brake Pad gouges as undercarriage spread apart and broke before A/G became airborne again during Waveoff

LUIGI GETS A LOW MEATBALL!

"Welcome aboard."

ACCIDENT OF THE MONTH

One Engine, One Ocean and

Safety After Sundown

Basics of Piloting

"They laughed when I said 'I am going to learn to fly'..."

Leaves from a "Lead-Sledders" Log

The ability to fly after dark can add flexibility to the use of your airplane. But before you dash out into the night skies, be sure you know what you're doing.

I need a night checkmate for the night. "Could you give me a hand?"

APP
D

SINBAD STRIKES AGAIN!?



JET FIGHTER BOUNCES OFF FLIGHT DECK


A Skyhawk jet fighter wrecked its undercarriage in an abortive night landing attempt on HMAS Melbourne on Wednesday, the Navy said yesterday.

The pilot gave the jet full throttle in a split-second reaction and lifted the fighter back into the air from the carrier flight deck.

The carrier was at sea at the jet's intended to be the base at Whitt, Alaska, Alaska.

NIGHT DRAMA

The jet was on Wednesday night was attempting its first night landing aboard Melbourne. The jet bounced off the flight deck and then flew for about a mile. The carrier was at sea at the jet's intended to be the base at Whitt, Alaska, Alaska.



A pilot making his first night carrier's deck jump with his "touch and go" landing hit the wheels and had to fly back to Norway and make an emergency landing.



Say something amusing

THE RAMP WASN'T BUILT TO STAND THIS!

HMAS Melbourne Round Down

Tyre marks


Wheel Brake Pad gouges as undercarriage spread apart and broke before A4G became airborne again during Waveoff

← Further up the deck were twin paint marks from the drop tank fins scraping the deck. The tanks were not breached though. The marks stopped before No.1 wire though.

Aftermath from night DL 01 Sep 1971



Click above for USN Viking? night arrest OK



This view is not actual ramp damage view - just a contemporary photo showing the ramp from an unusual angle. (Perhaps we can see the dents in the steel that by now have been painted over.)



Click above to hear LCDR Barry Diamond, Senior Pilot (SP = XO) of VF-805 in mid 1975 at NAS Nowra, 'J' Hangar, talk about Night Carrier Landings aboard HMAS Melbourne



Click the black image to view a USN video ↘



The forward-facing camera of the RF-8G allowed for some spectacular carrier approach photography. Here a VFP-206 aircraft heads for the deck of Saratoga.



The forward-facing camera of the RF-8G allowed for some spectacular carrier approach photography. Here a VFP-206 aircraft heads for the deck of Saratoga.

The image is taken from a reconnaissance RF-8 Crusader approaching a big USN carrier. In this view you can see the orange ball between the green datum lights. The orange ball is slightly high but this may be a factor of where the camera is in relation to the pilot's eyeline. So for the pilot view his is likely "in the groove" with the orange ball in the middle of the datum lights. BTW the orange ball moves vertically to show the pilot where he is in relation to the glideslope. So when the ball is above the line of green lights — the pilot is above the ideal glideslope and vice versa.

To add one further note about my own lucky escape. The ramp was moving as explained, usually it does so in a regular cycle with the sea state. Why I saw the ramp much higher was that the sea had given it a kick out of cycle, then by the time I got there to hit it, the ramp was most likely at the lowest point in its cycle and was probably just going up again. This helped me survive. There were not many knowledgeable (SEs & LSOs) witnesses to confirm this, as quite rightly, they were diving for cover. Ouch. So this is just my guesstimate. At the time I hit I was not "spotting the deck" (looking at the deck, as this would have been fatal). But I was concentrating on climbing at the best OAO, getting the best climb angle and rate of climb to get out of that black hole (this meant that the deck was no longer in view due to the exaggerated climb angle). So many factors combined to get me out of my (very own bad) catastrophic approach.

at #1 "bagging" Day DLP's prior to Night trips to the deck. Also using the days was SBLT THOMPSON as he built up his total arrests and Cats to 20, CAG plus some VC 724 Pilots also taking the opportunity to do some DLP's while the slots were available. During the period Monday to Wednesday a total of 17 Day & 8 Night DLP sorties were flown. Wednesday night saw our first major accident with the Skyhawks when SBLT THOMPSON in A/C 885, on his first Night DLP sortie, suffered a Ramp Strike, damaging the main undercarriage. He returned to Nas NOWRA for a Short Field Arrest with undercarriage retracted.

With only 2 A/C serviceable on Thursday, flying was restricted to a Press Display on HMAS MELBOURNE and one G.F.P. Friday was a compensatory long weekend for the Squadron however one sortie did get airborne. SBLT COX completed his N.E.F. bringing the total of N.E.F.s to 3.

885 had a Utility Hydraulic failure so there was no way the undercarriage was retracted, the struts were broken and dangling in the breeze and they just happened to end up in that odd forward / backward configuration during the landing runout.

	DAY	NIGHT
Sorties	24	9
Hours	28.35	9.45

[Signature]
 LCDR. R.A.N.
 COMMANDING OFFICER 805 SQDN.

At #5 Again the week was spent DLPing at day 'to keep our hand in' and to qualify those who were not night qualified. LEUT DALY and SBLT COX were the last to night qualify when they flew on Wednesday night, so all except SBLT THOMPSON are now night fliers.

Other flying during the week was LEUT JOHNSON completing his I.R.T. on Monday, a number of tests flights on 886 which is replacing 885, and CMDR DA COSTA flying some DLP sorties during the day. A/C 882 is also serviceable although it has a stiffback stick movement, making the total number of 4 A/c serviceable for the better part of the week.

No flying was carried out on Friday as the entire Squadron had enough to do with packing and transporting stores for the big shift on Saturday, which ran smoothly except for one load of personal gear dropped in the water. All A/C embarked on Saturday afternoon after which the Melbourne returned to Jervis Bay to anchor until Monday morning.

	DAY	NIGHT
Sorties	23	6
Hours	21.20	7.30

[Signature]
 LCDR. R.A.N.
 COMMANDING OFFICER 805 SQDN.

*For excellent emergency performance in snaggin' and
draggin' the nylon tape of land-based aircraft arresting equipment*

Membership for life is hereby conferred on

SBLT Phillip James Thompson

in the

Grand Order of Tape Dragons


By the hand and seal of

Supreme Saurian

A4G undercarriage breaks on the ramp but the aircraft is on the way up already under full power, continuing to climb despite “no bounce”

There is a significant number of seconds delay before full power takes effect even though full power is selected by the throttle lever. This delay would depend on the RPM power at time of selection of full power – 100% RPM

WAVEOFF
initiated here



Deck Landing area

Click on 'note icon' below to open it



Aircraft flightpath

OGGIN

Go to http://www.gibstuff.net/a4_alley/a4s_RAN.html for more video clips of RAN A4G Skyhawk launch & catapult to download with information about each one.

During the work up of HMAS Melbourne and her squadrons an incident occurred during a night landing which demonstrated the rugged qualities of the A4 Skyhawk. The aircraft got low on its final approach and broke a main undercarriage leg but was able to overshoot. An attempt to land on board would only have added further hazard, accordingly the aircraft was diverted for an airfield landing.

The aircraft was fitted with a drop tank on each wing attached to what is referred to as a “hard point”. These points proved to be just that! The tanks being empty it was decided to lay a carpet of foam in the touchdown area just beyond the  miss arrester gear, and talk the pilot down to an arrested landing, with the remaining undercarriage legs retracted. While the foam was being laid an experienced Landing Signal's Officer briefed the pilot on all contingencies to expect during the approach and landing. The aircraft caught the arrester gear and the drop tanks absorbed all of the impact. The underside of the aircraft did not contact the runway, and the subsequent repairs included the drilling out and replacement of some 270 sprung rivets, together with a new undercarriage leg. The aircraft was then returned to service.

STUDENT NAVAL AVIATOR CQ by Scott Rogers

[Drop Tank Landing on Runway] from Skyhawk Association website www.skyhawk.org

This occurred sometime in the mid to late 1980's; I can still see the event as clear as day, just as it happened yesterday. It started as just another CQ det (Carrier Qualification detachment) at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida. All three TRAWINGS pooled their aircraft and shared them with the student pilots as fast as the carrier could take them. Things started to go downhill from the start. TW-3 and VT-7 pilots brought back Scooters from the boat requiring two engine changes and a serious overstress inspection - all to our TW-2 aircraft! Sadly, one VT-7 pilot disappeared and I think his body was never recovered. I vaguely recall a truck delivering a small piece of wreckage to the hangar that some fisherman had snagged.

Toward the end of the first day's second CQ cycle, we overheard an emergency call to the Det Ops folks on the radio. A VT-7 SNA (Student Naval Aviator) had made an EXTREMELY hard landing on a touch-and-go at the ship and broke a retaining gear at the top of the starboard main landing gear strut allowing the strut to hang almost a foot lower than normal. With the extra length of strut exposed, he was unable to raise the gear. Rumor Control had it that the SNA was told to bail out by the powers-that-be aboard the ship, but he had flown back to the Naval Air Station with the gear down. We all lined the edge of the ramp as he made a pass for Ops to look him over while burning off any gas left in the drop tanks. Everyone gasped at the sight. The starboard

wheel was about 16 inches lower and cocked 90 degrees to the runway! After circling for a time, the fuel state was apparently within limits and the crash crew ready. Everyone who wasn't otherwise occupied lined the ramp to watch the crash that was sure to come.

I don't know exactly what kind of precautionary approach was used, but we watched intensely as he settled toward the runway. As soon as the starboard wheel touched the pavement, it snapped off, cartwheeling end over end down the runway underneath the tail of the Skyhawk. Our intrepid aviator punched the throttle and resumed flying without touching another wheel to the ground. Free of the extra long strut, he was able to raise all of the landing gear and made a few circles while the errant strut and wheel were recovered from the runway where they had tumbled and bounced for a couple hundred feet. Once again, he made his approach, this time wheels-up.

▲ I have heard stories of the Skyhawk Ski Club, but now we got a chance to watch it gain a new member. The engine was shut down just before touchdown and the Skyhawk slid along on the drop tanks showering the runway with sparks. After enough of the aluminum had disappeared from the bottom of the tanks, gravity took over and they collapsed slightly within a second of each other and a small explosion as the last few ounces of fuel ignited. The flames disappeared quickly and the Skyhawk slid to a stop with only a skinned nose, a couple of BCM 300 gallon drop tanks, and a starboard main landing gear to repair. ▲

Scooter's Forever!

4.2.6 Effects of Deck Motion. During flight operations, deck motion seldom exceeds $\pm 1.5^\circ$ pitch, $\pm 2.2^\circ$ in roll, and 5.5 feet in heave. Using basic geometry, each 1-foot aircraft vertical deviation from optimum glideslope moves the hook touchdown point forward or aft in the landing area by the following distances:

BASIC GLIDESLOPE ANGLE	DISTANCE IN FEET
3°	19.1
3.5°	16.4
3.75°	15.3
4°	14.3

Thus, 5.5 feet in heave will move the hook touchdown point ± 90 feet on a 3.5° glideslope. Note also that 3° of pitch (1.5° up, 1.5° down), although not exceeding lens stabilization limits, equates to 24.1 feet of vertical ramp movement (based on CVN-71's 461-foot pitch axis to ramp distance).

WIND OVER DECK (KNOTS)	BASIC ANGLE (DEGREES)	EFFECTIVE GLIDESLOPE*
35	4	3.2
30	3.5	2.8

*Based on a 130-knot approach speed

4.2.7 Effective Glideslope Due to Wind and Deck Motion. The glideslope angle, referred to as the basic angle aboard ship, is the fixed pitch angle around which the lens assembly stabilizes. A basic angle setting of 3.5° is most commonly used, with 4° used for higher wind-over-deck conditions (38+ knots) or on the small decks when hook-to-ramp clearance is near the 10-foot minimum. In moderate wind-over-deck conditions (32 to 37 knots), a 3.75° basic angle may be desirable. In Figure 4-7, note that decreased closure rate of aircraft to ship caused by wind-over-deck reduces the actual glideslope flown (effective glideslope).

Aircraft landing stress limits are predicated on moderate deck conditions. Extreme deck motion may significantly increase these landing stresses; the ramp coming up at touchdown increases relative sink rate. Additionally, 1° of ramp down is the same as adding 1° to the glideslope as far as aircraft landing stresses are concerned. These deck motion factors are among the most critical to consider when landing aircraft on carriers.

During pitching deck conditions the aircraft hook may not engage the crossdeck pendant at the optimum angle. This may result in an apparent increase in the frequency of hook-skip bolters.





Figure 4-7. Glideslope Glidepath Relation with RHW

SECTION 5

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YEAR 1971	AIRCRAFT		CAPTAIN OR 1st PILOT	CO-PILOT, 2nd PILOT, CREW OR PUPIL	DUTY	M.A.D.D.L.S.		I.F. APPROACHES			
	TYPE AND MARK	No.				DAY	NIGHT	TYPE	No.		
Totals Brought Forward						—	—	—	—		
AUG 12	SKYHAWK	888	SELF	SOLO	STRIKE FSUP & 30R/PSAW						
12	SKYHAWK	886	SELF	SOLO	IFP & MADDLS		9	GCA 1			
14	SKYHAWK	888	SELF	SOLO	FSUP - RADAR TRACKING						
20	SKYHAWK	888	SELF	SOLO	GF (HRA, LPA) & MADDLS	8					
23	SKYHAWK	885	SELF	SOLO	DLP - MELB						
23	SKYHAWK	887	SELF	SOLO	AS ABOVE						
24	SKYHAWK	888	SELF	SOLO	AS ABOVE						
24	SKYHAWK	888	SELF	SOLO	AS ABOVE						
24	SKYHAWK	888	SELF	SOLO	AS ABOVE						
25	SKYHAWK	887	SELF	SOLO	AS ABOVE						
30	SKYHAWK	888	SELF	SOLO	AS ABOVE						
30	SKYHAWK	887	SELF	SOLO	AS ABOVE						
805 SQUADRON				AIRCRAFT TYPES	AUG	8	40	TAC 2	3		
Summary for August 1971						26	83	GCA 213			
Signature <i>G. Thompson</i>						TOTALS CARRIED FORWARD					
Date 31st August, 1971											
SEP 01	SKYHAWK	888	SELF	SOLO	DLP - MELB (IFP)			TAC 1	GCA 2		
01	SKYHAWK	888	SELF	SOLO	DLP						
01	SKYHAWK	885	SELF	SOLO	NITE DLP (RAMP STRIKE & WHEELS-UP ASS. WING)		9				
06	SKYHAWK	887	SELF	SOLO	MADDLS						
07	SKYHAWK	888	SELF	SOLO	DLP						
07	SKYHAWK	887	SELF	SOLO	AS ABOVE						

Totals carried forward

Night Ramp strike - 2nd approach - after 1st successful 'touch & go'

DAY FLYING				NIGHT FLYING				FLIGHT TIME		INSTRUMENT FLYING		CAT SHOTS	
DUAL	1st PILOT	2nd PILOT	DECK LANDINGS	DUAL	1st PILOT	2nd PILOT	DECK LANDINGS	TOTAL COLS. 1-6 (7)	CAPTAIN (8)	SIM. (9)	ACT. (10)	Day	Night
(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)	(6)						—	—
222-30	603-50	9-35	—	17-10	44-50	—	—	897-55	597-55	70-30	46-50	—	—
	1-20							1-20	1-20				
	1-00				.15			1-15	1-15				
	2-15							2-15	2-15		1-30		
	1-15							1-15	1-15				
	1-00		2					1-00	1-00				
	.55		6					.55	.55			2	
	1-00		6					1-00	1-00			4	
	1-00		5					1-00	1-00			4	
	0-20							.20	.20			1	
	1-30		2					1-30	1-30			2	
	1-15		3					1-15	1-15			2	
	1-25		5					1-25	1-25			5	
	20-00		33		4-00			24-00	24-00		2-35	20	
 <p>The Royal Australian Navy Fleet Air Arm wings only valid once the first deck landing is made successfully — 23 August</p>													
<p><i>G. P. R.</i> L.C.P.R. R.A.N. COMMANDING OFFICER VF 805</p>													
222-30	623-50	9-35	33	17-10	48-50	—	—	921-55	621-55	70-30	49-25	20	—
	1-00							1-00	1-00		.20		
	1-30		5					1-30	1-30			2	
					1-15		1	1-15	1-15		.40		
	.40							.40	.40				
	1-15		4					1-15	1-15			1	
	1-00		5					1-00	1-00			5	
(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)	(6)		(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	—	—

Nº 3 A4 OFS

VC 724

YOU ANOTHER

BRINGS

CHAPTER IN GREAT

FIGHTER PILOTS OF 1970



RANAS Nowra 724 Squadron Feb 1970

Former—RAN TA4G 880

Phil Thompson has provided the following information on this aircraft:

NZ6255 — 13732 — Bu 154911 — TA-4G — N13-154911 — 880
 boc US Jul 31, 1967; 724 Sqn

Delivered Ohakea Jul 12, 1984 (F/L I. Walls). 1st production Kahu upgrade.

Incident Sep 1989 Ohakea - touched down short of threshold losing starboard main u/c — arrested landing on drop tanks. The right screenshot shows the arrestor gear on runway, then the left screenshot shows the flash of fuel vapour at end of rollout.

Returned to service Mar 1990.

This also happened at night in my similar arrested landing (after ramp strike) but in both cases the fire did not persist. That flash had me hopping out 'real quick'. :-). At the end of the runout as the pilot suggests in the commentary (not on this clip) there is a "small fire" (flash) as the fuel vapour in the empty drop tanks ignites at the end of the runout.

Click the very large picture to play an embedded video of this RNZAF incident illustrated below.

This AVI video will require the DivX codec 5.02 min (no sound)

NOW replaced with a .WMV video so should be no problem

